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 ON THE USE OF LAW IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: LEGAL DIALOGUES BETWEEN 






1. There is a perceived excess of ǲlower case EU constitutional lawǳ in EU External 
Relations law.1 However, this excess does not extend to transatlantic relations 
between the EU and USA.2 Bilateral transatlantic relations are typically depicted as ǲinstitutionally-lightǳ,3 given that they operate through High Level Working 
groups, task forces or policy fora and networks of private actors.4 The sources of 
bilateral EU-US relations lie in bilateral regulatory cooperation agreements, as 
well as Protocols, Exchanges of Letters, thus in both binding and non-binding 
rules. The most significant Transatlantic policy collaboration thus far, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) agreed in 1995, is not itself a formal treaty.5 The use 
of law in bilateral transatlantic relations is usually captured in scholarship as an 
instrument for regulatory cooperation and policy diffusion.6 Thus law is rarely an ǲendǳ in this domain, more so a ǲmeansǳ. Nonetheless, law plays a significant 
role in contemporary transatlantic relations outside of the bilateral context 
which, from the perspective of EU External Relations law, might seem neither 
conventional nor apparent.7 In fact, non-bilateral transatlantic relations 
increasingly deploy law as a communication tool between the two legal orders. 
For example, in 2011, the US intervened informally and anonymously in the 
                                                             
1 Emphasis supplied. B. De Witte, ǮToo much constitutional law in the European UnionǮs Foreign Relations?ǯ, in B. De Witte and M. Cremona ȋedsȌ EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals 
(Hart Publishing, 2008), at 11. 
2 Transatlantic Relations are intended here to denote relations between the EU and the USA and not 
those, for example, with Canada or Latin America.  
3 Pollack, for example, assesses ten years of the policy programme of transatlantic relations, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) from 1995, to contain substantive ambition and legal-institutional modesty: M. Pollack, ǮThe New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections in an experiment in )nternational Governanceǯ, ȋʹͲͲͷȌ Ͷ͵ Journal of  Common Market Studies 899. Similarly J. Peterson et al., Review of the 
Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States: An independent study 
(Commissioned by European Commission Director General External Relations Unit C1 Relations with the 
United States and Canada, 2005). 
4 See generally M. Pollack and G. Shaffer (eds), Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2001). 
5 Signed in Madrid on 3 December, 1995.  
6 E.g. M. Pollack and G. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically 
Modified Foods (Oxford University Press, 2009); D. Bach and A. Newman, ǮSelf-Regulatory Trajectories in 
the Shadow of Public Power: Resolving digital dilemmas in Europe and the United States, Ǯ (2004) 
17 Governance 387; D. Bach and A. Newman, ǮThe European regulatory state and global public policy: 
micro-institutions, macro-influenceǯ, ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ ͳͶ Journal of European Public Policy ͺʹ͹; J. Scott, ǯFrom 
Brussels with Love: the Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the chemistry of Regulatory Attractionǯ, ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͷ͹ American Journal of Comparative Law 897. Less so, but not strictly speaking in a similar context, N. Krisch, ǯPluralism in post-national risk regulation: the dispute over GMOs and tradeǯ, 
(2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 1. 
7 ǲContemporaryǳ denotes here recent developments taking place approximately in the last decade, 
subsequent to the NTA.  
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formulation of EU legislation,8 while the US House of Representatives passed 
legislation to prohibit the impact of EU law upon the US legal order.9 Another 
example is constituted by EU amicus curiae submissions before the US Supreme 
Court in, for example, death penalty cases.10 The so-called ǲBrussels effectǳ is also 
the subject of recent scholarship, assessing the perceived spillover effect of EU 
regulatory standards onto US rules, in areas ranging from genetically modified 
foods, data privacy standards, antitrust rules to chemical safety rules.11 Similarly, 
the extent to which EU legal rules are actually transplanted into US law is 
increasing- for example, the transposition of EU environmental rules standards 
in California.12 Moreover, it has been suggested that the increasingly unitary 
nature of EU foreign policy has given rise to a heightened responsiveness by the 
EU to US foreign policy.13 While the bilateral relationship context is not strictly 
the focus of analysis here, notably the EU and US have recently begun to 
cooperate in the realm of Cyber Security and Cybercrime.14 One of the explicit 
EU-US goals in this context is to advance participation by EU States in the legally-
binding Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-crime, of which the US itself is 
not even a member.  
 
2. Non-legal scholarship suggests that bilateral transatlantic relations are 
institutionally modest.15 However, it is argued here that there are institutional 
dimensions to formal and informal transatlantic relations which indicate that 
they are at least quasi-institutional, despite their shortcomings or lack of formal 
                                                             
8 Ǯ)nformal note on Draft EU General Data Protection Regulationǯ ȋDecember ʹͲͳͳȌ, available at 
http://edri.org/files/12_2011_DPR_USlobby.pdf: ǮThis informal note comments on certain aspects of the widely leaked draft proposal to modernise the European Unionǯs data protection legal framework, and in particular the draft General Data Protection Regulation ȋthe ǲdraft regulationǳȌ. )t does not necessarily represent the 
views of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) any bureau of office, or any other US government agency…ǯ  
 See ǮUS Lobbying waters down EU data protection reformǯ, Euractiv (21 February 2012), publishing a US 
document entitled, Ǯ)nformal Comment on the draft General Data Protection Regulation and draft Directive on data protection in law enforcement investigations.ǯ  
9 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011 (HR 2594). 
10 Eg Atkins v. Virginia 536 US 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons 2004 WL 1619203 (US). See M.  Cremona, ǮValues in EU Foreign Policyǯ, in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos ȋedsȌ, Beyond the Established Legal Orders 
Policy interconnections between the EU and the rest of the world (Hart Publishing, 2011), 275. More 
recently, see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al,  pending before the US Supreme Court (No. 10-1491), 
where the European Commission made submissions in proceedings concerning the application of the 
Alien Tort Statute 28 USC §§1350 to European companies for human rights abuses in Nigeria. 
11 A. Bradford, ǮThe Brussels Effectǯ, ȋʹͲͳʹ-2013) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1 
(forthcoming). 
12 J. Scott, From Brussels with Love, n 7 above.  
13 See the analysis of EU-US relations in the several accounts given in ǮDevelopments in the Law- Extraterritorialityǯ, ȋʹͲͳͳȌ ͳʹͶ Harvard Law Review 1226. 
14 Council of the European Union EU-US Summit: Joint Statement 16726/10, Presse 315 (20 November 
2010), 3; Presidency Conclusions of the Cybercrime Conference (Budapest Conclusions), Budapest (12-13 
April 2011).  See above Part VI EU-US Cyber-crime and Cyber-Security goalsǯ.  
15 Eg M. Pollack, The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten, n 4 above; Peterson et al, Review of the 
Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States, n 4 above. 
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legal character.  A Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue is on-going since 1972, with 
only 1 of the 3 EU institutional co-legislators participating, with limited output.16 
Transatlantic annual summits have been held since the 1990s, continuing to 
generate challenges regarding the appropriate EU institutional representation, 
even after the Treaty of Lisbon.17 Overlooked also in non-legal scholarship is the 
direct contact between the US Supreme Court and Court of Justice of the 
European Union, which has been increasing since 2000, in the form of periodic 
judicial visits, despite a highly imbalanced mutual citation rate.18 The loose 
quasi-institutional character of transatlantic relations appears to permit the EU 
and US to communicate through law. Paradoxically, their respective judicial 
institutions have actually hosted the legal dialogues accounted for here- for 
example, as in the case of EU amicus curiae submissions before the US Supreme 
Court.  
 
3. The interactions between the EU and US outlined above deploying law are 
remarkable, given that they are manifold, frequent and recent. They form a direct 
and indirect legal dialogue, which actually takes place in their respective legal 
orders. It is a distinct and observable dialogue, outside of the strictly bilateral setting. ǲLawǳ in this context of interactions between the legal orders of the EU 
and US has a broad interpretation and includes caselaw, legislation, legal 
procedure, advocacy, procedural rules, legal fora and court procedures. The 
actors vary, as do the institutional arenas, which range from the legislative to the 
regulatory to the judicial and diplomatic. There appears to be considerable proximity between the two legal orders and a porous reception of each otherǯs 
legal standards. Law also remains a central tool in transatlantic disputes as a 
means to protect the autonomy of their respective legal orders. The bilateral 
casestudy of cybercrime and cyber security equally provides evidence of the 
flexible parameters for the use of law in bilateral transatlantic relations.  
 
                                                             
16 i.e. The European Parliament.  
17 And so, at the EU-US Annual Summit on 20 November 2010, post-Lisbon, the President Van Rompuy, 
President of the European Council welcomed President Obama to the EU-US Summit, while on the 
bilateral aspects of the economic relations, President Barroso briefed President Obama. The High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs, Baroness Ashton the new external representative of the EU, remained and continues to remain outside of this institutional interplay. See J. Monar, ǮEU-US relations at the outset 
of the Obama presidency: the potential for leadership and a new dealǯ, ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͳ͸ European Foreign Affairs 
Review 1; see also P. Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward 
Elgar, 2011). 
18 Press release No. ͷ͹/Ͳ͵, Visit to the Court of Justice of the European Communitiesǯ by a delegation from 
the United States Supreme Court (7 July 2003); Press Release No. 18/07, Visit of delegation of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities to the United States of America (27 February 2007). A search in the Curia database for a period of the previous five years, searching ǮUS Supreme Courtǯ in the Court of Justice 
yields four results, all opinions of Advocate General (27 June 2012). On the converse point, as to the US Supreme Court, see below ǮEU Amicus Curiae Submissions in US Death penalty casesǯ.  
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4. This account sets out to map the place of law in contemporary transatlantic 
relations largely but not exclusively outside of the bilateral context. The focus of 
this analysis is not on transatlantic regulatory standards themselves qua law19 or 
the motivations behind specific transatlantic policies, but rather to consider the 
distinctness and significance of certain contemporary interactions taking place 
between the EU and US which deploy law. This paper explores in detail most of 
the casestudies sketched in the introductory paragraph. Section I considers six 
individual cases, outlining the deployment of law in, inter alia, rule-making, 
judicial fora, law migration and policy responsiveness: (1) The EU-ETS Saga, (2) 
EU Amicus Curiae representations in the US, (3) EU Standards migrating across the Atlantic as the ǲBrussels effectǳ or ǲLaw Migrationǳ, ȋͶȌ US Policy 
Representations in the EU legislative process, (5) EU Foreign Policy ǲResponsivenessǳ: Secondary Sanctions and ȋ͸Ȍ EU-US Cyber-crime and Cyber-
security goals. Section II summarises the key elements of the casestudies, 
specifically the actors, fora and instruments thereof. 
Section I: Select casestudies 
I. THE EU-ETS SAGA 
 
5. To begin with, a particularly recent and provocative use of law in transatlantic 
relations arises from the example of the EU-Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). 
The EU-ETS is the cornerstone of the European Union's policy to combat climate 
change and its key tool for reducing industrial greenhouse gas emissions cost-
effectively. The inclusion of aviation in the EU-ETS has resulted in significant 
controversies. Thus, all flights arriving and departing from an aerodrome in the 
territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applied were included within the 
scope of Directive 2008/101/EC from 1 January 2012.20 The EU rules purported 
to exempt airlines from the ETS in certain instances, providing for a curious ǲlegal equivalenceǳ test. For example, Article ͳͺ of the Directive provided that a 
third country measure to reduce aviation climate change would be considered by 
the EU with respect to its optimal interaction with EU law.21 US and Canadian 
airlines launched proceedings to challenge the scheme, alleging the 
incompatibility of the EU-ETS with international law and notably, the non-US 
                                                             
19 See, for example, M. Pollack and G. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails, n 7 above; D. Bach and A. Newman, 
Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of Public Power and The European regulatory state and global 
public policy, n 7 above; N. Krisch, Pluralism in post-national risk regulation, n ͹ above. J. Scott, ǲFrom Brussels with Love, n ͹ above, considered infra in part ))). ǲEU Standards migrating across the Atlantic: The ǲBrussels effectǳ or ǲLaw Migrationǳ?ǳ  
20 Dir 2008/101/EC amending Dir 2003/87/EC, 3. 
21 On the nature and operation of this system, see J. Scott and L. Rajamani, ǮEU Climate Change 
Unilateralism: international Aviation in the European Emissions Trading Schemeǯ, ȋʹͲͳʹȌ ʹ͵ European 
Journal of International Law (forthcoming). 
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ratified Kyoto Protocol.22 The decision of the Grand Chamber of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union on the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) in 
Air Transport Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change23 rejected this challenge in December 2011. Of immediate interest to the 
present account is the response of the US House of Representatives to the EU 
rules in the midst of the litigation before the Court of Justice. At this point, it 
adopted a law prohibiting the application of EU rules in the US to US private 
actors, thereby supporting the position of the US airlines.24 Thus on October 24, 
2011, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted to approve the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011.25 Members 
of the US Senate also introduced a similar measure. The bipartisan legislation 
directed the Secretary of Transportation to prohibit US aircraft operators from participating in the EUǯs Emissions Trading Scheme ȋETSȌ.26 The House of 
Representatives sought to express its opposition to the obligation on American 
carriers to comply with EU law on the grounds that it would cost airlines $3.1 
billion in lost revenue between 2012 and 2020 if they abided by the EU rules. In 
the wake of the decision of the Court of Justice, which US airlines and legislators 
further objected to vociferously but subsequently complied with, China also 
warned of a looming trade war.27 Ultimately, the US airlines accepted the 
decision of the Court and imposed charges on airline tickets to recoup their costs, 
                                                             
22 It was argued inter alia that the EU was exceeding its powers under international law in not confining 
the scheme to European internal flights, that the scheme should have been negotiated and adopted under 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation and not unilaterally by the European Union and that the 
scheme amounted to a tax or charge in breach of international agreements.  
23 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, nyr. See  Scott and Rajamani, EU Climate Change Unilateralism, n ʹʹ above ; S. Bogojevic, ǮLegalising Environmental Leadership: A Comment on the CJEUǯS Ruling in C-366/10 on the Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Schemeǯ, ȋʹͲͳʹȌ ʹͶȋͳȌ  
Journal of Environmental Law  (forthcoming); E. Fahey & E. Herlin-Karnell, ǮSpecial )ssue Editorial: EU Law 
qua Global Governance Law? Deciphering Regulatory and Constitutional Competence between EU Environmental Law and Global Governanceǯ and E. Fahey ǮThe EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Court of Justice: The '(igh Politics' of )ndirectly Promoting Global Standards,ǯ ȋʹͲͳʹȌ German Law Journal  
(forthcoming). 
24 The bill was introduced by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman J. L. Mica (R-FL), 
Transportation Committee Ranking Member N. J. Rahall (D-WV), Aviation Subcommittee Chairman T. 
Petri (R-WI), Aviation Subcommittee Ranking Member J. Costello (D-IL), and other Members of Congress.  
25 See statement of N. Young, ǮThe European Unionǯs Emission trading scheme: a violation of )nternational Lawǯ, available at http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/Testimony.aspx?TID=6834 (27 July 2011).  
26 The bill also instructed US officials to negotiate or take any action necessary to ensure US aviation 
operators are not penalized by any unilaterally imposed EU emissions trading scheme. Under the scheme, 
any flights into or out of an EU airport, regardless of how long that flight is in EU airspace, would be subject to the programǯs emissions cap and trade requirements. US airlines would be required to pay an 
emissions tax to the EU Member State to which they most frequently fly.  The US Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, strongly objected to the levy on legal and policy grounds in correspondence to the EU: ǮUS 
threatens EU over green levy on airlinesǯ, Financial Times (19 December 2011).  
27 Chinese airlines were being reported to be refusing to pay EU carbon taxes: J. Watts, ǮChinese airlines refuse to pay EU carbon taxǯ, The Guardian (4 January 2012) and recently, the Chinese Air Transport 
Association was reported to be threatening the EU with counter-measures, such as impounding EU aircraft: A. Leung and A. Kotoky, ǮChina ready to impound EU planes in COʹ disputeǯ, Reuters (12 June 
2012).  At the time of writing, EU-ETS was being discussed in US Senate hearings: (6 June 2012). 
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resulting in compliance with EU law and underscoring the Realpolitik of the 
litigation.  
 
The EU-ETS saga represents a remarkably successful exportation of EU values, to 
a point, purporting to regulate where other global governance mechanisms had 
failed. Notably, the Court and Advocate General outline in detail the failure of the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation to produce a global regulatory regime.28 
That the EU was able to progress its own regulatory regime this far and succeed 
in this litigation itself represents an important de facto exportation of EU values.  
The Act of 2011 passed by the US House of Representatives indicates 
indisputably that the EU-ETS saga is one of the most controversial global 
regulatory wars of modern times. Overall, we witness EU globalized-rule making 
which impacted so adversely on US private commercial actors and thus 
generated EU-based litigation but also legislative action to prohibit the impact of 
EU law in the US. This, however, in turn ultimately resulted in compliance from 
affected parties in the US, but not from other third country parties such as China. 
The Act of 2011 had no bearing upon the litigation or the decision of the Court 
and at its height merely constituted a highly political statement of objection. Its 
potential, on the other hand, to complicate or colour the litigation was immense. 
The use of law and the legislative process so as to register disquiet to a foreign 
legal order with which the US has cooperated with so frequently appears 
combative, yet which ultimately procured compliance with EU law.  
 
However, the context of the US legislature legislating so as to register a 
retaliatory response to EU rules is surely remarkable, although not 
unprecedented in transatlantic relations. For example, in 1996 the EU enacted 
legislation to prohibit the impact of US law upon the EU legal order and its 
citizens, responding to the US Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act), which the US introduced after the downing 
of US aircraft by Cuba that year.29 Title III of that Act purported to allow legal 
proceedings be taken against EU citizens and companies involved in the 
trafficking of property formerly owned by US citizens and confiscated by the 
Cuban Government. The EU thereafter enacted a Regulation and Joint Action in 
response to US legislation passed, to protect against the effects of the extra-
territorial application of the US Act.30 The EU later requested a WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel in 1996 and the EU and US finally reached an agreement in 
1998, whereby it would drop its WTO challenge in return for an undertaking that 
                                                             
28 See the Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-366/10 n 33 above, para. 191, on the failure of the ICAO to adopt 
appropriate standards. 
29 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms Burton Act) of March 1996. Pub L. No. 
104-114 110 State 785 (1996) codified at 22 USC §§6021.  
30 Council Reg (No) 2271/96, Joint Action of 22 November 1996, OJ L 309/7 (1996). 
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the US would not prosecute any EU citizens under the US Act, an agreement 
which was never implemented into law.31 The EU-ETS dispute appears to 
represent a different form of transatlantic dispute deploying law to object to EU regulatory standards. The protectionist ǲpolitical sovereigntyǳ dimension to the 
Helms-Burton dispute appears less evident in the EU-ETS saga, the later focussing upon more ǲoutwardsǳ than ǲinwardsǳ. The EU-ETS and Helms-Burton disputes may pinpoint specific ǲlow pointsǳ in transatlantic relations, but equally 
underline the centrality of law as a political tool to directly protect the autonomy 
of the EU and US legal orders respectively.  
 
 
II. EU AMICUS CURIAE SUBMISSIONS IN US DEATH PENALTY CASES 
 
6. A similarly direct but less provocative intervention into the US legal system on 
the part of the EU is evident from the recent amicus curiae advocacy briefs by the 
EU before the US Supreme Court in death penalty cases.32 Of course this 
advocacy reflects a long-standing opposition by the EU to capital punishment.33 
Notably, the Extradition Treaty between the USA and EU contains a clause 
permitting the requested State to make non-application of the death penalty a 
condition of extradition.34 However, the EU has made various amicus curiae 
submissions in the US Supreme Court in a diversity of cases without specific 
application to the EU, and importantly, occurring prior to the Treaty of Lisbon.35 
The height of criticism of these representations in scholarship largely concerned 
the appropriate representation of EU policies and values prior to the EU 
                                                             
31 See J. (uber ǮThe (elms-Burton Blocking Statute of the European Union,ǯ ȋͳͻͻ͸Ȍ ʹͲȋ͵Ȍ Fordham 
International Law Journal 699. 
32 See McCarver v. North Carolina  533 US 975 (2001); Atkins v. Virginia 536 US 304 (2002); Roper v. 
Simmons 534 US 551 (2005); Medellin v. State of Texas 552 US 491 (2008). See the account given M. 
Cremona, Values in EU Foreign Policy, n 11 above. Amicus curiae briefs are also known as Brandeis briefs. 
There is a longstanding history of the filing of Brandeisǯ briefs before the US Supreme Court since the 
decision there in Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908). The US Supreme Court receives voluminous 
numbers of such submissions annually. 
33 ǮEU Demarches on the issue of the death penalty- Declarationǯ,  in Conclusions of the General Affairs  
Council, 29 June 1998; EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, Council doc. 10015/08, 5 June 2008 ; now 
Article 19(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights. All EU member States are party to the ECHR protocol 13 on 
the abolition of the death penalty: see also M. Cremona, Values in EU Foreign Policy, n 11 above ;  I. Manners, ǯNormative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?ǯ, ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͶͲ Journal of Common Market 
Studies 235. 
34 Agreement on Extradition between the United States and EU [2003] OJ L 181/27, Article 13.  
35 The Union has now single legal personality post-Lisbon: Article 47 TEU; A. Gardner and S. Eizenstat, ǮNew treaty, new )nfluence?ǯ, ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͺͻ Foreign Affairs ͳͲͶ. See R. Gosalbo Bono, ǮThe organisation of the external relations of the European Union in the Treaty of LisbonǮ, in Koutrakos ȋedȌ, The European Union’s 
external relations a year after Lisbon ȋCLEER Working Paper ʹͲͳͳ/͵Ȍ, ͳ͵ and E. Paasivirta, ǮThe EUǮs external representation after Lisbon: new rules, a new era?ǯ,  in Koutrakos ȋedȌ, The European Unionǯs 
external relations a year after Lisbon (CLEER Working Paper 2011/3), 39. 
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possessing a single legal personality.36 The impact of this EU advocacy in recent 
death penalty cases is in fact explicit and moderately successful in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.37 Moreover, the US Supreme Court is not noted for its 
amenability to the deployment of comparative law or the methods of foreign 
legal orders.38 As a matter of EU law, certain institutional EU actors possess 
express amicus curiae powers, to advocate EU values. For example, the European 
Commission possesses amicus curiae powers in EU competition law, in Council 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 before national courts, in a field where it remains a 
distinct guardian of the values of EU treaties as a matter of EU law. Notably, it 
rarely exercises these powers, underscoring the controversy that interventionist 
representations and direct advocacy can draw upon an actor.39 The particular 
relationship between national and supranational enforcement of Competition 
Law is also relevant there. Thus, the external advocacy of EU values, principles 
and interests is especially remarkable before the US Supreme Court. It should be 
noted that in the spirit of reinforcing its advocacy before the US Supreme Court, 
the EU has recently sought to restrict the availability of the drugs employed in 
capital punishment in the US.40   
 
7. This intervention by the EU in the US highest court suggests a distinctive 
ambition by the EU to act globally as a virtuous, even noble foreign policy actor, capable of intervening in the ǲinternal affairsǳ of no less than the US, in a 
sensitive policy domain.41 This form of action further suggests that the EU has a 
                                                             
36 )t has been contended that the EUǯs amicus brief in Atkins was filed by the Council and not by the 
Commission and that here the Commission allegedly pursued the brief without a Council mandate and 
where the UK accordingly filed a brief; W. Pryor, ǯForeign and )nternational law sources in domestic constitutional interpretationǯ, ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ ͵Ͳ Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 173, 174. See, for 
example, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 US 692 (2004) where the EU unsuccessfully advocated in respect of the application of the Alien Tort Statute: see W. Dodge, ǮAlien Tort Litigation and the perspective Jurisdiction Fallacyǯ, ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷͳ Harvard International Law Journal Online 35, 37.  See above n 11. 
37 Atkins v. Virginia 536 US ͵ͲͶ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ. Justice Stevens speaks of the views of the Ǯworld communityǯ in 
condemning the execution of the mentally retarded:  at 317, n. 21. However, see Medellin v. State of Texas 
552 US 491 (2008), where the EU unsuccessfully made submissions in proceedings concerning the 
constitutional impropriety of an Executive Order instructing State courts to implement a judgment of the 
International Court of Justice. 
38 On minimalist comparative law usage before the US Supreme Court: see M. Minow, ǯThe Controversial 
Status of International and Comparative Law in the United Statesǯ, ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͷʹ Harvard International Law 
Journal Online ͳ; A.L. Paulus, ǮFrom Neglect to Defiance- The United States and )nternational Adjudicationǯ, 
(2004) 15(4) European Journal of International Law 783; See D. Sloss, M. Ramsey and W. Dodge, 
International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
39 Pursuant to Article 15(3), Reg 1/2003, the Commission may seek to intervene as amicus curiae and 
submit written observations to the court of the Member States where the coherent application of Articles 
101 or 102 TFEU requires doing so. By 2010, the Commission had only used these provisions on four 
occasions, despite its special place in the EU legal order in relation to Competition Law and Policy. In 
2012, there were 8 published amicus representations on the website of the Commission- still numerically 
limited, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html. (last visited 28 June 
2012). 
40 E. Pilkington, ǯEurope moves to block trade in medical drugs used in US executionsǯ, The Guardian (20 
December 2011). 
41 See I. Manners, Normative Power Europe, n 34 above. 
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global ǲconscienceǳ and is capable of advocating it in any forum, not least the 
distinctive internal setting of an amicus curiae brief in a court case. The global nature of this ǲpromulgationǳ of EU values is distinctly different to the usual 
exportation of EU values in, for example, trade agreements, diplomatic 
advancements and legislation. Cremona has demonstrated how fluid the 
importation and exportation of values in EU foreign policy remains.42 There is 
much fluidity in the notion of value promotion, particularly as the EU frequently 
imports values and norms, but also acts itself often as a model for values.43 It 
seems apparent that EU foreign policy has resulted in precarious commitments 
by the EU to the spread of its own values-the EU has suspended agreements on 
fundamental rights grounds only in a minority of instances.44 The unity of the EU advocacy ǲpositionǳ in an amicus curiae brief is in reality justifiable and even 
perhaps to be expected, post-Lisbon on account of the enhanced coherency on 
EU external relations. However, it is the locus of the activity which is perhaps 
more significant- before the highest US Court. This EU advocacy generally 
suggests a self-perceived ability and intent to influence the outcome of sensitive 
litigation. Perhaps the unitary actions of the EU in this specific forum prior to the 
Treaty of Lisbon are more significant from the point of view of external 
observers of EU foreign policy. Successful advocacy, i.e. when amicus curiae submissions are adopted, has a tangible and direct effect on the ǲreceivingǳ legal 
order. The interventions of the EU in such a high-profile forum so as to advance 
EU values seemingly renders the EU more prominent globally and indirectly 
influences the transatlantic dialogue on standards between legal orders.  
 
III. EU STANDARDS MIGRATING ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: EMPIRICAL 
ACCOUNTS OF POROUSNESS IN THE ǲBRUSSELS-EFFECTǳ AND ǲLAW 
MIGRATIONǳ  
 
8. There is an emerging literature on both the reception and effects of EU rules 
globally, including in the US. This literature purports to capture and theorise an 
asserted global trend to adopt or replicate EU standards and norms as desirable 
                                                             
42See M. Cremona, Values in EU Foreign Policy, n 11 above, 277, writing of the double commitment of EU 
to international law and more specifically to multilateralism.  
43 See ibid, 285. From a vast number, two prominent examples might be the European Convention on (uman Rights or the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. See M. Cremona, ǮThe European Union as a global actor: Roles, models and identityǯ, ȋʹͲͲͶȌ Ͷͳ Common Market Law Review 553.  
44 e.g. unilateral EU suspension of treaties has occurred in relation to countries such as Zimbabwe, Liberia, 
Togo, Fiji, Guinea and Mauritania. The EU has also invoked trade sanctions for human rights violations 
without a human rights clause strictly providing for it in the case of Myanmar: B. De Witte, ǯThe EU and )nternational Legal Order: the case of (uman Rightsǯ, in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos,  Beyond the 
Established Legal Orders. Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 127, at 143. See E. Fierro, The EU’s approach to Human Rights: Conditionality in Practice 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2003).   
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goals but also the inevitable result of trading with the large-scale EU internal 
market block. Two specific recent empirical analyses of these developments are 
worth considering for the account here, as tangible evidence of porous 
transatlantic rule-making processes increasingly taking effect across many fields 
in the non-bilateral context. The first, by Bradford conceptualises the exportation 
of EU standards to the US, while the second by Scott, depicts the actual reception 
of EU rules in the US. 45 Thus Bradford argues that a so-called ǲBrussels effectǳ has emerged. She argues that the ǲBrussels effectǳ de facto and de jure has emerged 
in a vast array of economic fields, whereby EU standards are adopted, 
particularly in the US, which are higher than comparable global standards. She 
outlines that: 
 ǲ…[f]ew Americans are aware that EU Regulations dictate the make-up they apply in the morning… the cereal they eat for breakfast...the software they use on their computer… and thatǯs before ͺ.͵Ͳ in the morning…ǳ46  
Bradford contends that the EUǯs unilateral power to regulate globally is in reality 
greatly underestimated and argues overall that the EU has ignited a process of 
the Europeanization of important aspects of global commerce. Rather, the EU is 
often wrongfully portrayed as a weak actor given the reality of its regulatory reach. (owever, her emphasis on the significance of the ǲBrussels effectǳ upon US 
law appears sometimes drawn from slender evidence. For example, she outlines 
EU antitrust law as an example of unilateral EU global regulation. To this end, she 
provides four specific instances of stricter EU antitrust laws prohibiting mergers 
and imposing more stringent conditions than under comparable US laws.47 Thus 
four singular cases provide proof that EU regulators and standards are adverse 
to, or at odds with, decisions of the US regulator (ie the Federal Trade 
                                                             
45 A. Bradford, The Brussels Effect, n 12 above, J. Scott, From Brussels with Love, n 7 above. Bradford depicts the Brusselsǯ Effect as the opposite of the ǲCaliforniaǳ effect, whereby stringent Californian standards are adopted as best practice standards in other StatesȌ. She cites EU antitrust laws and the EUǯs 
treatment of mergers relative to US transaction clearances as evidence of this. Secondly, she uses the 
example of EU Privacy standards, being adopted in over 30 countries in similar forms as further evidence 
thereof. 
46 Ibid, at 1, (forthcoming script).  
47See 12-14 (forthcoming script): GE/Honeywell, Microsoft and Intel (citations omitted).  Boeing/ 
McDonnell Douglas (citations omitted), considered by her, stand alone as a notorious instances of 
divergence- see J. Griffin, ǮEC and US Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperationǯ, ȋͳͻͻ͵Ȍ ͳ͹ȋʹȌ Fordham 
International Law Journal 353, 375 who asserted that despite considerable differences in the legal tests 
operating to trigger EC jurisdiction as opposed to the tests under US, the differences had not hindered 
enforcement initiatives on either side of the Atlantic (at 380).  The first Merger Regulation was adopted in 
December 1989. The number of six thousand approximate decisions is arrived by means of examining 
firstly, the former merger decision search tool (case ordered by number) to see when the first decision 
was taken http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index_en.html#by_case_number (last 
accessed 5 November 2012). The numbering in the beginning is not consecutive but can be contrasted 
with the latest case number: 
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Commission (FTC) and its rules, out of several thousand EU merger decisions.48 
She gives, by contrast, minimal space to exploring how especially high US 
regulatory standards in, for example, financial regulation and corporate 
responsibility have not yet become global standards.49 Perhaps Bradford 
indirectly considers or dwells less upon the role or size of markets as an 
explanation for the adoption of EU practices, a more latent question possibly 
relevant to such a thesis. 50 Moreover, a distinct question relates to the moment 
at which an EU Regulation becomes a global regulation and how this differs from 
the US adoption of EU rules. Nevertheless, the ǲBrussels effectǳ is a rich account 
of contemporary rule-making processes between the EU and US and 
demonstrates the actual proximity between the two legal orders.  
 
By contrast, a more specific casestudy of a similar theme is evident in the 
account of Scott who has depicted the actual reception of EU Environmental 
chemical standards, REACH,51 in Californian law, in terms of ǲlaw migrationǳ.52 
The EU standards were notably adopted there despite their opposition by US 
federal government leaders. In fact, REACH rules are studied by a significant 
range of scholars globally, on account of their innovative character, as well as 
global desires to comply with their content.53 Scott sought, however, to depict the transatlantic ǲreverseǳ adoption of rules ȋie EU rules in the USȌ by way of 
comparative law standards- notably publishing the results in the American 
Journal of Comparative Law. Scott suggested instead that sometimes actors simply desire to ǲtrade up standardsǳ, by way of a hypothesis for the adoption of 
the EU standards in the US. Most significantly to her account was the 
constitutional explanation within US law for the developments. Thus she 
contended that the open ǲdisaggregation of power in the USǳ derived from 
federalism enabled the reception of such EU standards. Moreover, the end 
process of the reception of the EU rules in the US, she suggested, was brought 
about by way of a form of a reciprocal regulatory learning experience, involving a 
variety of actors- NGOǯs producers and consumers alike played a role in the 
                                                             
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_merger_by_date (last accessed 
5 November 2012), thereby indicating over 6000 approximate cases. 
49 e.g. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002; The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
2010. 
50 See D. Drezner All politics is global: explaining International regulatory regimes (Princeton University 
Press, 2007). 
51 Reg (EC) No 1907/2006 amending Dir 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Reg (EEC) No 793/93 and 
Commission Reg (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Dir 76/769/EEC and Commission Dir 91/155/EEC, 
93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC. 
52 J. Scott, From Brussels with Love, n 7 above. 
53 See e.g. Y. Naiki, ǯAssessing policy reach: Japanǯs Chemical policy reform in response to the EUǯs REAC( Regulationǯ, ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ʹʹ Journal of Environmental Law 171.  
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migration of law.54 What was unique about this migration process, she contends, 
was that it was not attributable to courts, nor was it attributable to any formal 
hierarchy of norms. Another less vivid formula to depict the REACH casestudy is 
as a legal transplant, a well-worn formula derived from comparative law 
literature.55 The distinct character of US federalism in the midst of this use of EU 
legal standards is quite significant to the adoption of REACH, as is the 
progressive character of Californian environmental policy. Put another way, the 
adoption of innovative legal standards was far from impossible and was 
appropriate to the needs to the legal trans-planter. These empirical accounts 
both depict widespread practices involving the reception of standards and the 
reasons for them, as well as the porousness of the space between the EU and US to each otherǯs legal norms. The ǲBrussels-effectǳ or ǲlaw migrationǳ to the US of 
EU rules provide considerable empirical evidence of contemporary transatlantic 
rule-making between legal orders, thus a very distinct and observable legal 
dialogue.56 
 
IV. US POLICY REPRESENTATIONS IN EU LAW-MAKING 
 
9. A particularly notable intervention by the US in EU law-making and its legislative 
process has been in the area of data transfer law. Data transfer in bilateral EU-US 
Justice and Home Affairs agreements constitutes a particularly sensitive area of 
EU-US relations.57 Thus a particularly notable intervention by the US in internal 
EU law-making occurred recently in 2011, whereby a self-expressed ǲ)nformal noteǳ on a Draft EU General Data Protection Regulation was published as a 
leaked document by the Civil Liberties organisation Digital Civil Rights in Europe. 
The document was expressly formulated not to represent the views of a variety 
of US agencies- such as the US Federal Trade Commission, FTC bureau or agency 
                                                             
54 She relies extensively in her account on the work of J. Resnik, ǯLawǯs migration: American exceptionalism, silent dialogues and federalismǯs multiple ports of entryǯ, ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ ͳͳͷ Yale Law Journal 
1564, which similarly places federalism centrally to that account.  
55 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford University Press, 
4th edn, 2010). 
56 (owever, their empirical accounts do not capture the converse transfer of ǲadversarialǳ legal culture 
from the US to the EU, which for example Kelemen has sought to depict, considering the rising incidence 
of litigation culture in the EU, albeit a European variant thereof. Yet their accounts depict actual rule-
transfers rather than social practices. See R. Daniel Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law 
and Regulation in the EU (Harvard University Press, 2011); R. D. Kelemen, ǮEurolegalism and Democracyǯ, 
(2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 55. The case studies of Bradford and Scott are notable in so 
far as they indicate the reception of EU economic-based rules in the US. By contrast,  in EU legal 
scholarship, there is a distinct viewpoint that the EU has adopted policies in the area of counterterrorism 
and EU-US cooperation arising from an imbalance of political power: See M. Cremona, Justice and Home 
Affairs in a Globalised World: Ambitions and Reality in the tale of the EU-US SWIFT Agreement (Institute for 
European integration Research, Working Paper No. 4/2011).  
57 Cremona, n 68 above. 
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or any other US agency and intended to influence EU rules.58 The document 
raised a range of legal concerns which were interpreted overall to be a measured 
contribution towards the substantive policy debate.59 By contrast, the US 
Department of Commerce had previously made so-called ǲinformal representationsǳ on EU data legislation, which were perceived to have had a 
considerable impact on the legislative process.60  
 
10. The actions of the US agencies or bodies in the former intervention, expressly 
dissociating themselves from US agencies, but suggesting a desire to be a stake-
holder in EU policies, indicates a particular state of diplomacy. These particular 
representations are significant because of the explicit polarity between the EU 
and US legal orders on mutual recognition. Remark-worthy is the extensive, early 
and detailed nature of the legal policy interventions by the US in EU law.61 The 
nature of the representations made by the US are ostensibly of more interest to 
the present author than the precise substance of them, yet the substance is not 
irrelevant given the character of law and justiciability in bilateral security 
agreements. However, the uniform consensus of US-based political scientists, 
international relations experts and legal scholars based in the US is that EU rules 
have resulted in higher standards of US data policies.62 Newman has argued that 
transatlantic bilateral agreements have resulted in different constellations of US agencies and have ameliorated agency ǲterritoriesǳ and practices.63 Equally, 
                                                             
58 Ǯ)nformal note on Draft EU General Data Protection Regulationǯ ȋDecember ʹͲͳͳȌ:  ǮThis informal note comments on certain aspects of the widely leaked draft proposal to modernize the European Unionǯs data protection legal framework, and in particular the draft General Data Protection Regulation ȋthe ǲdraft regulationǳȌ. )t does not necessarily represent the views of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)  any bureau of office, or any other US government agencyǳ, available at 
http://edri.org/files/12_2011_DPR_USlobby.pdf.  
59 The comments, critical overall, suggested inter alia that the EU rules had potentially adverse effect on 
the global interoperability of privacy frameworks, would undermine freedom of expression, criminal 
cooperation and would undermine civil litigation.  
60 ǮUS Lobbying waters down EU data protection reformǯ, Euractiv ȋʹͳ February ʹͲͳʹȌ, Ǯ)nformal 
Comment on the draft General Data Protection Regulation and draft Directive on data protection in law enforcement investigations.ǯ   A more conciliatory tone was later adopted by the US: 
 ǮThe United States understands and respects that the EU is still in the early stages of considering 
data protection proposals to strengthen and update its framework. At the same time, however, 
we have heard reports that, based on inter-service consultation, the widely – available version of the draft Regulation…may undergo further review before it is released.ǯ 
61 Media reports suggested that the US had sought to be briefed unusually early and had contacted EU 
officials and briefed them with the position of the US Government, out of normal practice: ǮUS Lobbying waters down EU data protection reformǯ. 
62 The Safe Harbor Agreement represents a useful example of the impact of EU data transfer principles 
upon US policy, adopted into response to EU law, albeit by means of a voluntary framework: U.S. Dep't of 
Commerce, Safe Harbor Principles, July  21,  2000. See 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm. The principles were endorsed by the 
European Commission: Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour 
privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, 
2000/520/EC, OJ L 215 p 7). 
63 Bach and Newman, Self-Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of Public Power, n 7 above. 
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Shaffer and Bradford amongst others seem to be uniformly of the viewpoint that 
cooperation with the EU in Justice and Home affairs has operated to raise US 
standards of data privacy.64 By contrast, EU scholars caution against the impact 
of transatlantic security measures on individual rights under EU law.65 
Whichever viewpoint is preferred, one witnesses transatlantic intervention in 
the EU legislative process and active participation in transatlantic rulemaking, 
using law in a variety of ways. 
 
Two further but briefer case studies are outlined here next, followed by a 
summary of the features of the examples detailed. 
 
V. EU FOREIGN POLICY ǲRESPONSIVENESSǳ: SECONDARY SANCTIONS  
 
11. Finally, a perceived heightened policy responsiveness on the part of the EU in the 
transatlantic context mediated through law is worthy of some mention. A unified 
EU Foreign Policy was the intended objective of the Treaty of Lisbon.66 It has 
entailed that the EU is a more vocal and effective actor in international relations 
and has begun to participate more effectively as a matter of international law 
and Global Governance- for example at the UN.67 However, the EU has frequently 
opposed efforts to extend extra-territorial jurisdiction on the part of the US 
across the Atlantic.68 Equally, many allies of the US have vigorously opposed the 
most aggressive US claims of jurisdiction.69 The US often displays exceptionalist 
practices in its interactions with the international legal system. For example, 
Congress has passed legislation which the State Department had previously 
advised explicitly to be inconsistent with international law.70 The asserted recent 
responsiveness of the EU to secondary sanctions of the US is notable then. In this 
context, primary sanctions involve trade boycotts and are used to restrict, for 
example, US companies and businesses from trading with rogue groups or 
                                                             
64 G. Schaffer, ǮGlobalisation and social protection: the impact of EU and international rules in the ratcheting up of US data privacy standardsǯ, ȋʹͲͲͲȌ ʹͷ Yale Journal of International Law 1; A. Bradford, 
The Brussels Effect, n 12 above.   
65 e.g. M. Cremona, Values in EU Foreign Policy, n 11 above.  
66 See, for example, P. Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy, n 18 above.; J. Monar, US relations at the 
outset of the Obama presidency, n 18 above.   
67 Contrast, for example, the role and impact of the EU in the negotiation of the UN disability Convention as outlined by G. De B’rca, ǯThe EU in the negotiation of the UN Disability Conventionǯ, ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͵ͷȋʹȌ 
European Law Review and then later its evolution post-Lisbon to super-observer status, accorded in 2011. 
On 3 May 2011, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/65/276 upgrading the status of the 
European Union's participation in the United Nations. 
68 See Developments in the Law-Extraterritoriality, n 14 above.  
69 (. Clark, ǮDealing with US Extraterritorial sanctions and foreign countermeasuresǯ, ȋͳͻͻͻȌ ʹͲ University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law ͸ͳ; J. Griffin, ǮExtraterritoriality in US and EU Antitrust Enforcementǯ, ȋͳͻͻͻȌ ͸͹ Antitrust Law Journal 159.  
70 See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, and Developments in the Law- Extraterritorialityǯ, n ͵ͻ above,  at ͳʹͶ͸, fn. ͹  and above section I, part I. 
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terrorists. However, secondary sanctions are trade boycotts which are used to 
restrict the economic ability of, for example, non-US actors from doing business 
with groups or entities the subject of primary sanctions, for example, in the form 
of the US Helms-Burton Act discussed above.71 Extra-territoriality is thus often a 
significant element of secondary sanctions. In recent times it has been stated that 
the EU has harmonized its laws to accord with US action in the area of secondary 
sanctions or secondary boycotts unlike any other previous transatlantic 
cooperation.72 European resistance to US secondary sanctions is suggested to 
date back to the 1960s, whereby the EU continued protesting against US 
secondary sanctions throughout the ʹͲͲͲǯs.73 The shift in the state of relations 
here is then discernible.  
 
12. In 2010, the US passed extra-territorial US legislation on sanctions against Iran, 
namely the US Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act of 2010 (CISADA). The decision of the EU to respond to extra-territorial US 
legislation on sanctions against Iran in the form of harmonising its own laws with 
the US sanctions in 2010,74 has been interpreted to have occurred  on account of 
changes to the structure of the EUǯs foreign policy and its increased diplomatic 
powers post-Lisbon. On this view, the Treaty of Lisbon thus enabled the EU to 
respond more efficiently to the US and cooperate with it using legal instruments 
more readily.75 Moreover, a unitary EU foreign policy structure post-Lisbon was 
perceived to increase the likelihood that US policymakers would consider the EUǯs interests differently and more readily, giving the EU greater negotiation 
credibility. However, it should be noted that subsequently in 2012, the EU again 
imposed sanctions against Iran,76 but the actions of the EU do not necessarily 
appear to correlate to US action at this time. 
 
13.  The economic tradeoffs raised by the US measures, CISADA, were less significant 
than those faced in other earlier extraterritoriality conflicts, as was the security 
and diplomatic context prevailing. Judgments on these types of assertions are 
                                                             
71 See J. Mayer ǮSecondary thoughts on secondary sanctionsǯ (2009) 30(3) University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law 905 at 905-ͻͲ͸; N. Davidson ǮUS secondary sanctions: the UK and EU responseǯ ȋͳͻͻͺȌ ʹ͹ Stetson Law Review 1425.  See above section I, part I.  
72 Developments in the Law- Extraterritoriality, n 14 above; J. Griffin, EC and US Extraterritoriality, n 59 
above; A. Bradford, The Brussels Effect, n 12 above.  
73 See ǮEuropean Union: Demarches Protecting the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarityǯ ȋL)BERTAD), 
Act (5 March 1996 & 15 March 1995)  reprinted in 35 ILM 397, 398-399; Memorandum of Understanding 
concerning the US Helms-Burton Act and US Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, EU-US, 11 April 1997, 36 ILM 
529.  
74 e.g. Council Reg (EU) No 961/2010 repealing Reg (EC) No 423/2007.  
75 Developments in the Law- Extraterritoriality: The European Union and Secondary Sanctionsǯ, n ͳͶ 
above,  at 1246. 
76 Council Implementing Reg (EU) No 54/2012 implementing Reg (EU) No 961/2010; Council Reg (EU) 
No 56/2012  amending Reg ȋEUȌ No ͻ͸ͳ/ʹͲͳͲ; P.E. Dupont, ǮCountermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against )ranǯ, ȋʹͲͳʹȌ ͳ͹ Journal of Conflict and Security Law (forthcoming).  
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more challenging to assess given that the policy, the timing of the reaction policy 
and the form of the policy responded to must be considered in their context, and 
much of this form of analysis is outside of the scope of the present discussion. 
Overall, however, this specific instance provides another example of certain 
proximity in-between the legal orders and in rulemaking. It also forms an 
example of the use of law as a central tool in a context readily depicted as high 
politics.  
 
VI. EU-US CYBER-CRIME AND CYBER-SECURITY COOPERATION 
 
14. Finally, worthy of remark is recent bilateral EU-US cooperation with particularly 
unusual legal parameters. While it should be repeated that bilateral relations are 
not the main focus for analysis here, one specific casestudy is notable on account 
of its legal objectives. The EU and US have recently begun to cooperate together 
in the realm of Cyber-Security and Cyber-crime, which has relevance for the 
current account.77 EU-US Cyber-crime and Cyber-Security Working Group 
(WGCC) was established after the EU-US Summit in November 2010.78 The EU-
US goals in this regard are to formulate global strategies, to carry out joint and 
global incident management, to foster public-private partnerships, to remove 
child pornography from the internet and to advance the international ratification 
Council of Europe Conventions on Cyber-crime79 of which the US is not a 
member but which it took part in drafting and has signed and ratified, promoting 
both international and EU ratification.80 There are several EU Member States still 
resisting ratification, including the Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Poland and 
Sweden. This makes the specific (legal) objectives the EU-US cooperation more 
curious. The extraordinary legal goal of this collaboration is evidence of the fluid 
parameters of the use of law in transatlantic relations.  
 
15. Finally, worthy of brief mention are the expected other deliverables of EU-US 
cooperation, which include the endorsement thereof by the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANNs).81 The aims of the transatlantic 
cooperation are thus to promote global standards through cooperative rule-
making. Further evidence of the global objectives of the rule-making and policy 
development is provided by the minutes of the July 2011 meeting of EU-US 
                                                             
77 Council of the European Union EU-US Summit, n 15 above; Presidency Conclusions of the Cybercrime 
Conference Budapest Conclusions Budapest, n 15 above.   
78 Ibid. 
79 European Treaty Series (CETS) No 185 Budapest (23 September 2001). 
80 J. M. Balkin (ed) Cybercrime, Digital Cops in a Networked Environment (New York University Press, 
2007). See also M. G. Porcedda, ǮTransatlantic Approaches to cybersecurity and cybercrime,ǯ in P. Pawlak 
(ed),  The EU-US security and justice agenda in action (EUISS Chaillot Paper, 2012). 
81 EU-US working group on cyber-security and cyber-crime, Concept Paper (13 April 2011), 3. 
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Senior Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Officials, where it was stated that the EU 
and US should work together in the UN to avoid dilution of the body of 
international law on cybercrime.82 The overtly global ambitions of both the EU 
itself and the EU-US together, i.e. seeking to promote global standards arising 
from their own rule-making, are striking. The objectives and deliverables of the 
bilateral cooperation seem to suggest that legally conventional goals are not 
applicable here, emphasising the dynamism and flexibility of transatlantic rule-
making between the EU and US legal orders, which in turn allows the EU and US 
to pursue higher and more globalised objectives through the medium of bilateral 
relations. While the specific relationship between non-bilateral and bilateral 
relations is difficult to pinpoint, law is deployed very flexibly in both contexts 
such that the pursuit of global rule-making becomes feasible.  
 
Section II. THE KEY ELEMENTS OF TRANSATLANTIC LEGAL DIALOGUE DEPLOYING 
LAW  
 A VARIETY OF ACTORS, FORA, FLEXIBLE AND VARIABLE INSTRUMENTS  
 
There is a legal and institutional component to transatlantic relations that is 
discernible from the many casestudies here. More recently, a direct and indirect 
legal dialogue between the EU and US is observable outside of the conventional 
bilateral context of EU External Relations law. The quasi-institutional character 
of transatlantic relations permits these dialogues or interactions through law to 
take place, yet also acts as a backdrop for such interactions, for example, for example, in each otherǯs judicial institutions. There is also a significant proximity 
between the EU and US legal orders, evident in various empirical accounts and 
foreign policy developments. Overall, the individual case studies presented here 
suggest porousness and ease in the use of law by many actors in various 
institutional fora between the EU and US legal orders in recent times.  
 
To summarise the case studies, firstly, the use of legislation in the EU-ETS 
dispute and the deployment of EU institutions and procedures by transatlantic 
political actors supported by their legislators in their own legal system is a 
distinctive form of transatlantic rule-making. The legislation in the EU-ETS 
dispute unsuccessfully challenged European efforts to engage in global 
governance legislation when global legislative infrastructure did not offer the EU 
appropriately high legislative standards. Secondly, the submissions made by the 
EU before the US Supreme Court in death penalty cases show the EU indirectly 
engaging in rule-making in the US using US institutions as their forum. The 
                                                             
82 General Secretariat of the Council, ǮSummary of conclusions of the EU-US JHA Informal Senior Officials 
Meeting 25-ʹ͸ Julyǯ ȋʹͻ July ʹͲͳͳȌ p. ͵.  
Formatted: Not Highlight
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intervention in formal court proceedings constitute compliant conduct on the 
part of the EU, in order to further its own policy goals before a judicial forum 
where considerable discretionary constitutional powers are exercised. On 
account of its prominence, the participation in this forum clearly has global 
impact and offers the EU visibility.  In this way, the use of law between the EU 
and US deploys many fora and actors, at the highest possible levels, beyond 
diplomacy. The use of advocacy is highly distinct behavior and sets particularly 
broad parameters to the use of law in transatlantic relations. Thirdly, the ǲBrussels effectǳ and law migration instances may indicate flexible rule transfer. 
The widespread nature of the practices asserted in this regard are themselves 
notable and again emphasize the malleability of the  space between the EU and 
US to accommodate direct and indirect rule adoption and rule transfer. The accounts of the ǲBrussels effectǳ and ǲlaw migrationǳ indicate the openness of transatlantic relations to each otherǯs legal norms.  Fourthly, in the case of data 
transfer rule development, the interventions by non-specific US agencies using 
advocacy resulted in detailed input into EU rules. This input is permitted 
between the legal orders given that the legal space is flexible, as are its 
procedures. However, the contrast here between formal and non-formal rule-
making is particularly notable, given the explicit polarity in the bilateral context between the two legal orders on mutual recognition of each otherǯs justice 
systems.83 For example, the most recent EU-US Passenger Name Records 
Agreement expressly limits legal redress and delimits legal character under US 
law to administrative effects only and not legal effects, despite its curiosity as a 
statement under international law.84 A European Commission so-called ǲnon-paperǳ leaked in February ʹͲͳʹ, however, outlines to the Council the state of 
negotiations between the EU and US on Data Protection. It discloses significant 
legal differences between the two orders in the realm of justice and home affairs 
cooperation, differences which have some relevance to the analysis conducted 
here of the non-bilateral context.85 The US interventions then in the non-bilateral 
context are not per se legally binding but nonetheless provide evidence of 
variable entry into rule-making fora so as to pursue their lawmaking objectives. 
Penultimately, EU foreign policy responsiveness to the US remains in the realm 
of high politics. However, it also indicates the high degree of proximity actually 
existing in-between the legal orders. Last but not least, EU-US Cyber-crime and 
Cyber-security cooperation emphasises how seemingly impossible legal goals 
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through law become possible on account of the close cooperation between the 
two legal orders using law.  
 
These examples drawn together indicate the diversity of elements of 
contemporary transatlantic relations which overall deploy law flexibly. They 
provide many vivid examples of the variable institutional and legal components 




At first glance, the account provided here is arguably neither conventional nor 
apparent as a matter of EU External Relations law. Nonetheless, it has been 
shown here that a direct and indirect legal dialogue between the EU and US legal 
orders in the non-bilateral context is evident and observable. This dialogue 
indicates that contrary to the ostensible insignificance of law in contemporary 
non-bilateral transatlantic relations, law has in fact a broad application in this 
domain. The EU and US use readily the legal procedures and constitutional structures of each ǲotherǳ. The case studies depicted here involve many actors in 
diverse institutional settings- political, institutional, individual and corporate 
actors. The US Supreme Court has provided the EU with a prominent forum to 
promulgate its policies. Similarly, the US has participated in the EU legislative 
process using law as a medium so as to advance its own position.  
 
Several of the accounts provided here constitute striking examples of the use of 
law as a political tool or the use of law to protect the autonomy of their 
respective legal orders. Other instances of similarly direct but less provocative 
interventions between the legal orders show the varying levels of engagement 
through the dialogues. The actual proximity between legal orders in the area of 
rule-transfer is an important facet to the dialogues depicted here also, ranging from the ǲBrusselsǯ effectǳ case studies to secondary sanctions. These case 
studies emphasise the significance and centrality of the role of law and 
institutions to the legal dialogues taking place between the EU and US. 
 
 
 
